Quelling the Polycrisis

By Jeremy Brecher, Senior Strategic Advisor, LNS Co-Founder

Unpredictability is a core feature of the polycrisis. There is much speculation about what will come next in the world order, but there are scant grounds for predicting anything beyond more polycrisis. This commentary offers neither a prediction nor a plan, but a perspective on what might begin laying the basis for quelling the polycrisis.

An image posted on 20 January 2026 by Donald J. Trump, the U.S president at the time, during the Greenland crisis onto his “Truth Social” account. Photo credit: The White House, Public Domain

What new configuration of the world order will emerge out of the polycrisis? Many scenarios have been imagined or predicted, including:

• Three “spheres of influence” dominated by the world’s three superpowers

• Polarization into a new cold war led by two Great Powers

• Unending territorial struggles among territorial empires, along the lines of Ukraine and Greenland

• US hegemony reestablished via country-by-country submission to the threat or reality of US attacks

• A new global order imposed by Trump’s Board of Peace

• An alliance against US domination that significantly reduces US power or leads to a new global polarization

• Rule by a global kleptocracy

• Rule by a global Tech Bros oligarchy

• Fragmentation of the world order into a war of all against all

• Rivalry of random overlapping blocs-of-convenience

• Global depression, runaway inflation, or stagflation

• Any of these scenarios spilling into large conventional wars

• Small or large wars spilling into nuclear holocaust

Some of these may be plausible hypotheses. But in the context of the polycrisis all such hypotheses about possible futures are highly speculative. For example, after the US decapitation of Venezuela, speculation was rife about a new world order based on “spheres of influence.” But that ignored the vast economic power of China in Latin America. And it was rapidly followed by US bombings in countries around the world and its claims on Greenland. Even though each such speculation may be somewhat plausible, none of them has much chance of establishing itself before it is destabilized by others. The forces of chaos are at this point sufficient to undermine “the best laid plans of mice and men” – witness the escalation and proliferation of war in the Middle East and beyond following the US/Israeli attack on Iran. So, the most likely outcome is an ongoing struggle among disparate forces none of which, notwithstanding short-term successes, is likely to impose its will on the world. As Adam Tooze put it, we’re not even in an interregnum because “an interregnum implies another regnum afterward.” Call it polycrisis 2.0.

Feeling Our Way Out of Catastrophe

A photo of President Donald Trump in the Oval Office with several of his executive orders. Photo credit: The White House, Public Domain

The polycrisis is inhospitable to many forms of social change intended to create a better world, like national or global reform, national or world revolution, or even conventional coalitions. There are several reasons for this. The weakening or breakdown of multilateral forums for global cooperation like the UN and many others eliminate the main means through which governments have cooperated in pursuit of common interests and values. However detrimentally great power leadership was exercised, abandonment of leadership by great powers leaves a vacuum that is not easy to fill. The problem of amassing enough power to impose an alternative structure at any level is daunting. Multiple forms of fragmentation and chaotic, unpredictable conditions impede construction of stable coalitions and alliances. And overcoming the polycrisis requires not just overcoming an oppressive power through resistance but also overcoming disorder through new forms of cooperation.

On the other hand, the breakdown of the pre-polycrisis world order has some benefits. The power of the Great Powers, and especially the US, to shape the rest of the world has been significantly diminished. While they may have powers to destroy, their ability to determine outcomes is more questionable. For example, consider the failures of the Trump administration to block trade deals among other countries or to halt Greentech initiatives outside the US.

While large scale global transformation is difficult to envision in the context of the polycrisis, there are some objectives that might be realized at least in part. First is simply self-protection of the vulnerable; this can be seen in the scramble of many countries to form multiple trading and other relations in the face of tariff and other attacks. A second is harm reduction: for example, many countries outside the US have continued their efforts at climate protection in spite of fierce opposition from the Trump administration. Third, although the polycrisis impedes cooperative planning for the future, it is possible to build formal or informal bases that can serve as launching points for cooperation and restraint of destruction. For example, the International Solar Alliance, initiated in the leadup to the Paris climate summit by India with support from France, initially signed up fifteen nations to accelerate fossil-free energy production in the developing world; this has become an alliance of 120 nations using their joint purchasing power to cut the price they pay for solar production.

Polycrisis 2.0 exhibits several overlapping possibilities that might help quell the polycrisis:

Poly-alignment

In response to the rise of great power rivalry, aggravated by Trump’s aggressive use of tariffs, countries around the world have been rapidly moving toward “ poly-alignment” – building multiple relationships in multiple spheres and at multiple levels. This is exemplified by new deals between Canada and China and between the EU and India. Ravinder Kaur writing in the Guardian says that, while initially focused on trade, “The overarching EU-India comprehensive strategic agenda is really much larger in scope, taking in defense and security, commitments to multilateralism, mobility and cooperation in a range of areas.” It remains to be seen whether such multiple alignments will generate wider cooperation rather than new rivalries.

Intermediate Powers

Address by Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026. Photo credit: World Economic Forum, Wikipedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

Address by Mark Carney at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2026. Photo credit: World Economic Forum, Wikipedia Commons, CC BY 4.0.

A widely noted speech by Canadian prime minister Mark Carney, declaring that the old world order was facing not a transition but a rupture, called for an alliance of “intermediate powers” to “build a new order that encompasses our values, such as respect for human rights, sustainable development, solidarity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the various states.” He argued that the middle powers “must act together.” He said that “to help solve global problems,” Canada was “pursuing variable geometry, in other words, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests.” That is creating “a dense web of connections across trade, investment, culture.” He noted that in the previous few days, Canada had concluded “new strategic partnerships with China and Qatar” and is “negotiating free trade pacts with India, ASEAN, Thailand, Philippines and Mercosur.” The potential of intermediate powers to discipline the Great Powers and the polycrisis as a whole remains to be seen.

Coalitions of the Willing

Where specific aspects of the polycrisis can be isolated, coalitions can be organized to force cooperation or block actions that augment destruction. For example, in January 2025, Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia, and South Africa joined to form the Hague Group to coordinate legal and diplomatic measures in solidarity with the Palestinian people. In July 2025 it convened thirty governments for an Emergency Conference on Palestine which unanimously agreed “that the era of impunity must end—and that international law must be enforced without fear or favor through immediate domestic policies and legislation.” Twelve of the participating states committed to implementing six measures to end their complicity with Israel’s genocide of Palestinians, such as “preventing the provision of weapons, military equipment, and dual-use items to Israel, including ending the transit of any such materials through their territories or transport on any ships bearing their countries’ flags.”

(The US government has accused the Hague Group of trying to “weaponize international law as a tool to advance radical anti-Western agendas.”)

Forward March of Greentech

Unexpected breakthroughs are making energy produced by sun, wind, and water cheaper, safer, and more efficient than energy produced by fossil fuels. This is already transforming the way the world produces and uses energy and it will further transform economics, politics, and society. This is a global revolution, but it has so far been largely driven by China’s huge advances and investments in “Greentech”– technology that reduces or repairs harm to the environment. Greentech includes ways of producing energy like solar and wind power; ways of distributing it in time and space like energy storage and energy grids; and ways of using it like EVs and heat pumps. Countries and people around the world are producing and installing Greentech. In 2024, renewables worldwide made up 92% of all new electricity capacity additions. In the first six months of 2025, the world added 380 GW of new solar capacity — 64% higher than the 232 GW installed during the same period in 2024. The necessities of climate protection combined with the opportunities presented by a fossil free energy system could create a global dynamic with forms of cooperation that transcend the polycrisis.

Popular Movements

The elements of the polycrisis are doing unlimited harm to people in every country. In Polycrisis 2.0, popular movements can and are playing a role in contesting the governments that are aggravating war, impoverishment, authoritarianism, plutocracy, kleptocracy, climate catastrophe, and other elements of the polycrisis – and that are refusing to cooperate to reverse that aggravation. A dramatic example is the mass popular opposition that has developed to authoritarian rule in the US. This has ranged from the 7-million strong No Kings Day protests to the street-level resistance to attacks by ICE thugs on American cities. Such movements represent challenges not only to para-fascism and the destruction of democracy, but to the warmongering and obliteration of international cooperation they promote. Successful opposition to Trump and Trump-style rulers around the world is a first condition for quelling polycrisis 2.0.

Transnationalized Movements

On January 13, 2018, in Vienna, Austria, a large demonstration took place against the Black-Blue coalition, organized by Anti-Fascist Action. Photo credit: Haeferl, Wikipedia Commons, CC BY-SA 3.0

Quelling the polycrisis will ultimately require coordinated worldwide action by the world’s people to impose cooperation on the battling power centers that are threatening our life on earth. A prime example is the movement to support the Palestinian people against Israel’s genocidal attacks. Nearly 48,000 demonstrations in 137 countries and territories were held globally in the two years following the start of the Gaza war. In Europe, dockworkers refused to load weapons for Israel; in Italy millions participated in two general strikes and demonstrations for Palestinian rights. Such global social movements can play a crucial role in quelling the polycrisis. International linkages are developing that can augment them: For example, in January, delegates from twenty countries issued the San Carlos Declaration, pledging to coordinate action against coercion in the Americas. An International Antifascist and Anti-imperialist Conference is scheduled in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in March, called by signatories from more than 50 countries. And the Permanent Assembly Against the War brings together immigrants, workers, and activists from across eastern and western Europe, including both Ukraine and Russia, to organize for a “transnational politics of peace.” Such transnational linking organizations can help open a pathway to pacification of the polycrisis.

There are obviously contradictions among these varied forces. But that does not make their cooperation impossible, especially in the face of devastating threats. The challenge is how to navigate those contradictions to begin to quell the polycrisis.

The polycrisis is unlikely to be overcome by a return to a real or imagined past. Conversely, the chaotic nature of the polycrisis makes it fruitless to offer a plan or program to establish another “regnum.” The guidelines I present here simply offer a perspective on how to begin to move beyond the polycrisis.

First, recognize, align with, and support common human interests. These include the human rights of all people; government of the people, by the people, and for the people; the conditions of our earth and its climate that make our life possible; the constitutional principle that government must be accountable to law; global cooperation to provide a secure future for our people and planet; and our ability to live together in our communities, our countries, and our world. While people, institutions, and nations inevitably will act in pursuit of limited, short-term goals, we must make them do so in ways that advance rather than undermining common human interests. Otherwise, they will only aggravate the polycrisis and bring further ruin down on themselves.

Second, construct “patchworks” that bring together diverse actors around common interests. A fascinating study of “International Cooperation in Times of Polycrisis” describes “patchworks” as “patches or islands of creativity and refiguration forming in nodes or knots of assemblages across time and space.” They create limited islands of cooperation and peace in the polycrisis war of all against all. One example given by the study is the International Solar Alliance, described above. Another is the High Ambition Coalition, initiated by the Marshall Islands, which played the role of “global bridge builder” for a coalition that “straddled negotiating blocs organized around traditional North – South lines” to demand stronger climate agreements. It significantly influenced the content of the Paris climate agreement. The fragmenting world of the polycrisis opens up spaces for patchworks and other collective initiatives and may make it harder for any one power to destroy them. The notion of patchworks can encourage creativity in bringing together diverse movements, institutions, and countries to impose partial pacifications of the polycrisis.

Third, use patchworks to establish new practices of global cooperation. This involves reconstituting the UN and the 60-plus organizations for international cooperation that the Trump administration has recently quit, expanding their missions and power through “coalitions of the willing.” When that proves elusive, a “shadow UN” and similar alternative vehicles can temporarily fill in. If patchworks invent new forms of cooperation, those can be expanded to develop new international institutions and practices to start quelling the polycrisis.

In the words of Ray Acheson of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, “Building transnational networks of mutual aid, collaborative campaigns, and political education are going to be a key part of building a new world order.”